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Abstract: We introduce a class of two-player cooperation games where each player faces
a binary decision, enter or exit. These games have a unique Nash equilibrium of entry. How-
ever, entry imposes a large enough negative externality on the other player such that the
unique social optimum involves the player with the higher value to entry entering and the
other player exiting. When the game is repeated and players’ values to entry are private,
cooperation admits the form of either taking turns entering or using a cutoﬀ strategy and
entering only for high private values of entry. Even with conditions that provide opportu-
nities for unnoticed or non-punishable “cheating”, our empirical analysis including a simple
strategy inference technique reveals that the Nash-equilibrium strategy is never the modal
choice. In fact, most subjects employ the socially optimal symmetric cutoﬀ strategy. These
games capture the nature of cooperation in many economic and social situations such as
bidding rings in auctions, competition for market share, labor supply decisions in the face
of excess supply, queuing in line and courtship.
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In our economic and social interactions, we face the decision whether to cooperate with other
individuals on a daily basis. Cooperation often requires that one person cede his place to
another or else conﬂict or congestion ensues. Consider, for instance, two strangers who reach
the check-in counter at the airport at the same time. They can argue about who arrived
ﬁrst or, what is more socially eﬃcient, the person whose ﬂight does not leave for another
four hours can allow the hurried passenger to go ahead. As a result, the person with the
higher value for the action pursues it, while the other person acquiesces. Such a cooperative
outcome may well arise when individuals value the same outcome diﬀerentially, even in the
absence of repeated play, if acquiescence is not too costly for one of the players.
When the same pair of individuals plays against one another repeatedly and players’
values to cooperation vary over time, the cooperative solution whereby the person with the
higher value to defection does so, while the other play cooperates is optimal and likely to
emerge. However, when players’ values to cooperation are private and players are unable to
communicate or signal these values, this ﬁrst-best cooperative outcome is no longer feasible.
Instead, a diﬀerent convention needs to arise to provide for some measure of cooperation and
to avoid conﬂict. Two alternatives are possible.
First, players can take turns cooperating. Cooperation dilemmas in families are often
resolved by implementing this alternating strategy. Spouses take turns making important
decisions; parents avoid favoring one child over another by rotating favors between them;
and siblings settle scores by recalling who enjoyed the same privilege (like riding in the front
seat) last time. Firms that compete with one another in multiple markets or in the same
markets repeatedly, or bidders who compete for similar objects auctioned oﬀ sequentially can
cooperate by taking turns capturing the market, instead of pricing or bidding aggressively
in each market. Zillante (2003) presents evidence that the four baseball card manufacturers
alternate the timing with which they each introduce new product lines in order to reduceintra-period competition.1
A second form of cooperation available to players when values are private and cannot
be communicated or signaled is play according to cutoﬀ strategies. Cutoﬀ strategies entail
entering when the value to doing so exceeds some threshold or cutoﬀ value and cooperating by
not entering otherwise. Firms might implicitly collude by staying out of relatively high-cost
or low-demand markets with the expectation that rival ﬁrms will reciprocate. For instance,
auction participants might bid only when the object is suﬃciently valuable so as not to
inﬂate the winning bid unnecessarily. The spectrum auctions conducted in the U.S. and
Australia in which licenses were split up into numerous regional markets were susceptible
to such collusion, while European spectrum auctions in which nationwide licenses were sold
and incumbent ﬁrms varied from country to country provided less repeat interaction among
bidders and therefore less opportunity for collusion.2
In this paper, we introduce a class of two-player games with the following properties: 1)
non-cooperation is the unique dominant strategy; 2) the sum of players’ payoﬀs is higher if
both defect than if both cooperate; 3) in the socially optimal outcome, one player defects
and the other cooperates; 4) under incomplete information where players’ values to entering
are their private information, cooperation in the repeated game can take the form of cutoﬀ
strategies whereby players cooperate only if their private value for defection is suﬃciently
low or alternating strategies whereby players take turns cooperating.
We performed numerical optimization to select a parameterization best suited to study
experimentally the potential for cooperation. In the chosen parameterization, each player
receives a randomly drawn integer between 1 and 5 inclusive. A player’s number is his
private information. On the basis of his number, a player must decide between two actions:
1 Zillante (2003) discusses other known examples, such as the motion-picture and electrical switchgear
industries, in which new-product-release dates have been staggered to blunt head-on competition.
2 Indeed, the simultaneous open bidding employed in 13/16 of the FCC’s spectrum auctions allowed ﬁrms
to use the last digits of their bids to signal to others on which licences to bid or not bid. Cramton and
Schwartz’s (2000) analysis reveals that the small fraction of bidders who regularly used bid signaling paid
signiﬁcantly less for their licences, resulting in lost auction revenues.
2enter or exit. By exiting a player receives zero. By entering he receives his number if his
opponent exits and one-third of his number if his opponent also enters. Thus, entering in
the one-shot game is the dominant strategy; however, it imposes a negative externality on a
player’s opponent, since it lowers his payoﬀ by two-thirds provided he also enters.
One feature of the game parameterization chosen is that the optimal symmetric cutoﬀ
strategy and the alternating strategy yield very similar joint expected payoﬀs. This raises
the empirical question of which of these two strategies are subjects more likely to adopt.
We conduct this game for 80 rounds under three treatments that diﬀer according to the
point in time at which a player learns his opponent’s number (at the end of the round or not
at all) and the subject pairings (ﬁxed across rounds or randomly determined). Cooperative
behavior is found to be remarkably high in all treatments. We employ a simple strategy
inference technique to estimate each player’s best-ﬁt strategy. The optimal symmetric coop-
erative cutoﬀ strategy whereby a player enters on the numbers 3, 4 and 5, and exits otherwise
is subjects’ modal choice in all treatments. Revealing opponents’ numbers at the end of the
round is particularly conducive to cutoﬀ strategies since entry on low values is observable
and punishable.
When the opponents are ﬁxed and their numbers are not revealed, cooperation falls
oﬀ signiﬁcantly and the use of alternating strategies increases only marginally; cooperative
cutoﬀ strategies continue to be employed by over 70% of subjects even though play according
to these strategies cannot be observed. Surprisingly, the level of cooperative behavior is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when opponents’ numbers are again revealed at the end of the round,
but opponents are rematched in each round. This is true, despite the facts that defection,
while observable, is not punishable and coordination on alternating strategies is no longer
possible.
We believe our game and its payoﬀ structure captures the nature of cooperation in many
real-world scenarios. For example, McAfee and McMillan (1992) study collusive behavior
3in auctions that takes the form of bidding rings. Their main result when transfers are
impossible is that every bidder whose valuation for the good is greater than or equal to the
auctioneer’s reservation price should bid exactly the reservation price. We test for a more
sophisticated form of collusion; namely, even though a bidder’s valuation may exceed the
reservation price, he stays out. Moreover, individuals may choose not to enter contests or
competitions if their value for the prize or probability of winning is suﬃciently low and they
care about other more deserving or more capable participants. Junior employees backing
down from an internal promotion contest is a common occurrence. Cab drivers, bicycle
messengers, golf caddies, waitstaﬀ, sky caps and vendors in a marketplace often face the
decision of whether to compete for a customer or acquiesce, with the consequences of their
decisions similar to our game’s payoﬀ structure. More generally, labor supply decisions in
markets characterized by excess supply carry with them the positive externality of yielding
one’s place to another. In addition, relaxed shoppers commonly cede their spots in line to
those in a hurry, and Sunday drivers concede the right of way and willingly let in other cars.
Finally, two friends cruising the town in search of companionship continually confront the
dilemma of deciding who gets to pursue individuals they encounter.
In the next section, we develop the theoretical framework for this class of two-player
games and through numerical optimization select a particular parameterization for our ex-
periments. We contrast our game with related games on cooperation in section 3. In section
4, we detail our experimental design and procedures. Section 5 presents the results and
analysis. In section 6, we attempt to understand diﬀerences in cooperative behavior between
treatments, suggest why some cooperative strategies are more widespread than others and
discuss directions for future research. Section 7 concludes.
42 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Environment
We propose a two-player game with the following general structure. Each player receives
a randomly drawn integer between a and b inclusive where the probability of receiving a
number n is πn (where πn > 0 and
 
n∈{a...b} πn = 1) and faces a binary decision, enter or
exit. By exiting a player receives zero. By entering he receives his number if the other player
exits or some function f weakly increasing in his number (and possibly also a function of the
other player’s number) if both enter. We assume that f is less than his number; hence entry
imposes a negative externality on the other player. We also assume that if it is proﬁtable for
a player to enter alone (that is, his value is greater than zero), then it is also proﬁtable for
him to enter when his opponent enters (f > 0 for values greater than zero). For the purposes
of this paper, we consider games in which a player’s number is his private information.
2.2 Solutions
There are noncooperative and cooperative solutions to this game. If each player is concerned
about maximizing only his own payoﬀ, then we can solve for the Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
This yields the dominant strategy of entry for numbers greater than zero.
The cooperative solution is given by the pair of strategies that maximizes the sum of the
players’ expected payoﬀs. This can also be thought of as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if we
treat an individual player’s utility as the sum of the pair’s payoﬀs. Suppose the other player




πn {x(1 − p(n)) + p(n)[f(x,n) + f(n,x)]}.
The joint payoﬀ to staying out is
 
n∈{a...b} πnnp(n). If f is nondecreasing in both arguments,
then the cooperative solution entails cutoﬀ strategies (that is, for a ≤ n < b if p(n) > 0, then
5p(n + 1) ≥ p(n)). This is because if it is proﬁtable to enter with number x, then it is also
proﬁtable to enter with any number greater than x. These cutoﬀ values may be non-interior
and even asymmetric. A pure-strategy cutoﬀ is when there exists an n∗ such that for all
n ≤ n∗, p(n) = 0 and for all n > n∗, p(n) = 1. A mixed-strategy cutoﬀ is when there exists
an n such that 0 < p(n) < 1.
An extreme form of asymmetric pure-strategy cutoﬀs involves one player entering for all
numbers greater than or equal to a (i.e., always enter) and the other entering for numbers
greater than b (i.e., always exit). In a repeated game, this cooperative solution can admit the
form of players taking turns between entering and exiting. This solution may only reasonably
be expected in games in which the same pair of players interacts repeatedly.
2.3 Choosing a Particular Game
From this general framework, we selected a game to test experimentally with the goal of de-
termining the degree and nature of cooperation. To choose a particular game, we performed
numerical optimization on the space of games in which players’ numbers are drawn from a
uniform distribution of integers between a and b inclusive. We restricted f(x,n) to be of the
form x/k (where k is an integer) to aid the subjects’ understanding of the game.
Our objectives were twofold: 1) to design a game for which the joint expected payoﬀs
(to be also referred to as the expected social payoﬀ) from the optimal symmetric cutoﬀ
strategies and the alternating strategies are very similar; 2) to maximize the diﬀerence the
joint expected payoﬀ from playing the optimal symmetric pure-strategy cutoﬀ, c∗, and the
expected social payoﬀ associated with the second-best symmetric pure-strategy cutoﬀ. Put
another way, we want to maximize the steepness of the expected social payoﬀ function
around the socially optimal pure-strategy cutoﬀ. Achieving this second goal maximizes the
incentive for those players wishing to cooperate to enter for numbers greater than c∗ and
exit for numbers less than c∗. Deviations from this strategy can thus be interpreted as an
6intention not to cooperate fully.
Before computing the game that maximizes these objectives, we can prove general propo-
sitions about the solution for the optimal symmetric pure-strategy cutoﬀ and about the
socially optimal strategy as a function of the congestion parameter, k.
Proposition 1: The optimal symmetric cutoﬀ for numbers drawn independently from the
uniform distribution of integers from a to b and congestion parameter k is given by,
c
∗ =
−1 − 2b + (2a − 1) k +
 
12b (1 + b) (k − 1)
2 + (1 + 2b + k − 2ak)
2
6 (k − 1)
.
Proof: Let us examine the costs and beneﬁts of extending the symmetric cutoﬀ by one
from c − 1/2 to c + 1/2. We can represent the problem on a grid that is b − a + 1 units by
b−a+1 units. Each point on the grid refers to the net gains if the numbers drawn are from
that point. The uniform independent distribution implies that each grid point has equal
weight. Let us refer to each point as (x,y). The points aﬀected are (·,c) and (c,·). Divide
this set of points into three groups. Group one is (c,z) and (z,c) where z > c. Group two
is (c,z) and (z,c) where z < c. Group three is (c,c).
For each grid point in group one, there is a net gain of z − (z + c)/k. For group two,
there is a net loss of c for each grid point. For group three, there is a net loss of 2c/k. For











b (1 + b) (k − 1) − (1 + 2b + k − 2ak) c − 3 (k − 1) c2
k
.
This is simply a quadratic with both a positive and a negative root, where the positive root
is the optimal cutoﬀ. QED
From the expression for c∗, we see that as the congestion parameter, k, increases, so does
the optimal symmetric cutoﬀ for a given a and b. Intuitively, as k increases, it becomes
increasingly costly for both players to enter; as a result, the socially optimal threshold for






Proposition 2: When k ≤ 2, the socially optimal strategy is a cutoﬀ strategy. In the
uniform case, as k → ∞, the socially optimal strategy is alternating.
Proof: Independent of k, alternating yields a joint expected payoﬀ equal to the expected
value of the range of numbers. Consider the case of k = 2: the strategy of always enter
(the lowest possible cutoﬀ) yields half the expected value for each player. Thus, the joint
expected payoﬀs are the same for alternating and always entering. When the lowest possible
cutoﬀ is not the optimal cutoﬀ or when k < 2, the joint expected payoﬀ from the cutoﬀ
strategy will be strictly higher.
For the uniform distribution, using the grid method of the previous proof, alternating
yields (b−a+1)
 b
z=a z = (1+b−a)2(a+b)/2. Using a cutoﬀ strategy of c∗ yields a joint payoﬀ
of 2(c∗−a)
 b
z=c∗ z = (1+b−c∗)(c∗−a)(b+c∗). The expression (1+b−c∗)(c∗−a) reaches its
maximum at c∗ = (1+a+b)/2, yielding (1+b−a)2/4. Since (b+c∗) is maximized for c∗ = b,
we know the joint cutoﬀ payoﬀ must be strictly less than
(1+b−a)2· b
2 . For a > 0, this is less than
the joint alternating payoﬀ. QED
When the distribution of values is not uniform, the second result does not generally hold.
Take for example the values of 100 with probability 1/3 and 1 with probability 2/3. For
large k, alternating yields a joint expected payoﬀ of 34. Entering only when one has 100
yields 100 with probability 4/9 and ǫ otherwise. Hence, this optimal cutoﬀ strategy yields a
higher joint expected payoﬀ.
In our search for a parameterization that yields similar joint expected payoﬀs for the
optimal cutoﬀ and alternating strategies, Proposition 2 suggests values of k greater than 2,
but not too large: we allowed k to vary from 2 to 5. Over the range of numbers, {a,...,b},
we allowed b to be any integer greater than or equal to 3, and ﬁxed a = 1. This latter
decision was made in part because if a is an integer less than 1, then the strategy “always
8enter” is no longer a unique dominant strategy in the stage game. In selecting our game
parameters, for a given f, we can often increase the steepness of the expected social payoﬀ
function around the socially optimal pure-strategy cutoﬀ by shrinking the number of integers
in the range {a,...,b} (i.e., by lowering b in our case). However, when the optimal cutoﬀ
for the expected social payoﬀ is in mixed strategies, then this need not be true. Instead, the
expected social payoﬀ function connecting the two pure-strategy cutoﬀs that straddle the
optimal mixed-strategy cutoﬀ can be rather ﬂat. Indeed the optimal symmetric cutoﬀs are
in mixed strategies for (b = 3,k = 4), (b = 4,k = 4), (b = 5,k = 2) and (b = 5,k = 4).
An optimal solution in mixed strategies should be avoided due to the salience of the nearby,
almost optimal, pure strategies, the improbability that both subjects will solve for, and play,
the optimal mixed-strategy cutoﬀ and the added diﬃculty in analyzing the data.
The two optimal steepness parameterizations are (b = 3,k = 3) and (b = 5,k = 3). For
our experiments, we chose (b = 5,k = 3). Although the diﬀerence between the optimal
expected social payoﬀ and the second-best expected social payoﬀ from (b = 3,k = 3) is
0.30 per round, 0.06 units higher than the next-best parameterization of (b = 5,k = 3),
we decided against the former; with only three numbers in the range, arriving at the social
equilibrium of exiting on 1 and entering on 2 and 3 is too easy. We prefer a parameterization
for which the Nash and cooperative cutoﬀ solutions diﬀer by at least two numbers.
Figure 1 displays the results of our search for the range of numbers {1,...,5} and k ∈
{2,3,4,5}. The ﬁgure reveals that the optimal pure-strategy cutoﬀ value equals 1.5 for
k = 2, equals 2.5 for k = 3,4, and equals 3.5 for k ≥ 5.3 The ﬁgure also shows that the
steepness around c∗ is maximized for k = 3. For k = 3, the pair’s expected payoﬀ if each
player employs the optimal cutoﬀ, c∗ = 2.5, is 216/75. For c = 3.5, the pair’s expected
payoﬀ decreases to 198/75 and to 196/75 for c = 1.5. For c = 4.5, the pair’s expected payoﬀ
is 130/75 and for c = 0.5 (always enter) it is 1.
3 We express all cutoﬀs as halves to denote unambiguously that the player enters on all integers greater
than the cutoﬀ and exits otherwise.
9[insert Figure 1 here]
For our chosen parameterization, the alternating strategy actually yields the pair slightly
more in expectation than the optimal symmetric pure-strategy cutoﬀ:4 from alternating the
pair earns 3 units of proﬁt in expectation, 9/75 units more than from c∗ = 2.5. That these
two strategies perform almost equally well despite their qualitatively very diﬀerent natures
raises the empirical question of which one, if any, will be adopted by players.5 Not only
is the expected pair’s payoﬀ from playing the alternating strategy (3) higher compared to
the optimal symmetric cutoﬀ strategy (216/75), the variance of the expected payoﬀ is also
lower: 2 compared to 2.42. Part of the intuition why the payoﬀ variance is lower for the
alternating strategy is that this strategy always yields at least one unit of proﬁt, while with
probability 4/25 the optimal cutoﬀ strategy yields 0.
3 Related Literature
The best known and most frequently tested cooperation game, the prisoners’ dilemma, has a
unique dominant-strategy equilibrium in which both players defect; however, if both players
could commit to cooperation, both would be better oﬀ. The standard public-goods game is
an n-player extension of the prisoners’ dilemma in which each player decides how to allocate
his endowment between a private good (which beneﬁts the player alone) and the public good
(which beneﬁts all players equally). In the socially optimal outcome, all players contribute
their entire endowments to the public good; this conﬂicts with the unique dominant-strategy
equilibrium in which each player contributes his entire endowment to the private good.
Noncooperation (enter) is also the unique dominant-strategy equilibrium of our class of
4 We persist with the cumbersome language of “optimal symmetric pure-strategy cutoﬀ” because the
alternating strategies can be thought of as asymmetric pure strategies in which one player uses a cutoﬀ of
c = 0.5 and the other uses c = 5.5.
5 Notice that had we chosen k = 2, not only is the social payoﬀ function much ﬂatter around the optimal
cutoﬀ value, c∗ = 1.5, but the alternating strategy yields the identical expected social payoﬀ as always enter
(c = 0.5).
10games. Unlike the prisoners’ dilemma and public-goods games, however, the socially optimal
outcome in our game involves one person defecting and the other person cooperating. A
second distinction of our game is that if both players defect they are better oﬀ than if both
cooperate.
Amnon Rapoport and his coauthors have conducted various versions of a market entry
game. In an early version, Rapoport (1995), n symmetric players independently decide
whether to enter a market with capacity c ≤ n. Staying out yields a ﬁxed payoﬀ, whereas
entering yields a payoﬀ that decreases in the number of entrants and yields less than the ﬁxed
payoﬀ from staying out in the case of excess entry.6 In subsequent versions of the market
entry game, Rapoport and coauthors have explored the eﬀect of deciding whether to enter in
one of two markets where each market’s capacity changes in each period (Rapoport, Seale and
Winter, 2000) and asymmetric entry costs that are held constant throughout the experiment
(Rapoport, Seale and Winter, 2002). These games have large numbers of pure-strategy and
mixed-strategy equilibria, all characterized by some subset of players entering the market
with positive probability. Beginning with Kahneman’s (1988) original experiments on the
market entry game, the main result across all of these variations is that subjects learn to
coordinate on one of the Nash equilibria. Moreover, Erev and Rapoport (1998) have shown
that a variant of a reinforcement learning model can account for the mixed-strategy equilibria
observed in the play of standard market entry games.
Overall, these games and ours share the feature that entry imposes a negative externality
on other entrants. The most important diﬀerences are the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
in our setup and the fact that it is at odds with the full-information, social optimum whereby
one player cooperates and the other defects, whereas a multiplicity of Nash equilibria, all of
which are eﬃcient, characterize standard market entry games. Moreover, exit is a strictly
dominated strategy in our class of games for a > 0 and f > 0. Put another way, if both
6 The special case in which the payoﬀ for entering changes only in going from within-capacity to over-
capacity is known as the El Farol Problem (see Arthur, 1994).
11players enter (“excess entry”), unlike the market entry game, each entrant still earns more
than if he had exited.
4 Experimental Design and Procedures
4.1 Experimental Design
All experiments were conducted in (not necessarily ﬁxed) pairs. Each player in the pair
received an independently and randomly drawn integer between 1 and 5 in each round.
Subsequently, each player independently decided whether to enter or exit. The decision to
exit yields 0, whereas entry yields the value of the number if the opponent exits and 1/3 of
the value of the number if the opponent also enters. All experiments were conducted for 80
rounds with 5 initial practice rounds.7
We conducted three experimental treatments that diﬀer by the point in time at which a
player learns his opponent’s value (after the round or never) and by the opponent’s identity
(ﬁxed or random). In the baseline treatment, “AfterFixed”, the pairs are ﬁxed for 80 rounds
(but diﬀerent from the 5 practice rounds) and each player learns his opponent’s value at the
end of the round. This provides relatively favorable conditions for cooperation. For example,
the pair may coordinate on and enforce both the alternating and the cutoﬀ strategies. If a
player enters when it is not his turn to enter or on a low number, say 1, he recognizes that
his opponent will observe this defection and can retaliate by entering out of turn or the next
time he receives the number 1. Thus, for a suﬃciently long horizon, when cooperation is the
status quo, uncooperative entry is unproﬁtable.8
7 We opted for a known rather than a probabilistic terminal round both for reasons of simplicity of
design and to keep the theoretical analysis similar to the one-shot game. Moreover, Normann and Wallace
(2004) show that except for end-game eﬀects, subjects’ cooperative behavior in a prisoners’ dilemma game
is unaﬀected by the termination rule.
8 In all of our treatments, due to the certainty in the number of rounds, to always enter is the unique
Nash equilibrium in the repeated game as well as the unique dominant-strategy equilibrium in the one-shot
game.
12The two additional treatments are both one variation away from AfterFixed and are
hypothesized to make cooperation more diﬃcult to achieve. In the second treatment, “Nev-
erFixed”, pairs remain ﬁxed, however, a player does not observe his opponent’s number at
the end of the round, only his decision to enter or exit. Thus, with cutoﬀ strategies, if a
player decides to enter, his opponent does not know if he entered because he drew a high
number or because he is playing uncooperatively. This lack of information clearly renders
cooperation less likely. Another way to make cooperation more diﬃcult is to change players’
opponents in each round.9 In the third treatment, “AfterRandom”, like the baseline treat-
ment, players observed their opponents’ numbers at the end of each round; however, pairs
were randomly reformed in each round. Random opponents make it impossible for a pair of
players to build cooperation between them. Moreover, if pairs aren’t ﬁxed, the cooperative
strategy by which players alternate entering is no longer feasible.
In a repeated game, cooperation can be maintained even when players are self-interested
by means of punishment. Punishment is easiest in AfterFixed: if alternating or cutoﬀ strate-
gies are employed, any deviation is easily detected and punishable. Punishment is hardest in
AfterRandom: while deviation is detectable, punishment is unattainable. NeverFixed repre-
sents an intermediate case for punishment: although deviations from alternating strategies
are easily detected and punishable, detection in particular is diﬃcult for cutoﬀ strategies.
Frequent entry may just reﬂect lucky draws of high numbers. A rule could be adopted
whereby more than 7 entries in the past 10 rounds constitutes a deviation; however, eﬃciency
would be lost if more than 7 of the last 10 draws exceeded the cutoﬀ of 2.5. Furthermore,
how does the pair coordinate upon the rule of 7 out of 10, or any other?
9 Andreoni and Croson (forthcoming) survey the evidence on the impact of ﬁxed partners versus random
rematching on cooperation in public goods games.
134.2 Experimental Procedures
Upon arrival, each subject was seated in front of a computer terminal and handed the sheet
of instructions (see the Appendix). After all subjects in the session had completed reading
the instructions, one of the experimenters read them aloud. To ensure full comprehension
of the game, subjects were given a series of knowledge-testing questions about the game
(the questions are also contained in the Appendix). Participation in the experiment was
contingent upon answering correctly all of the questions.10 Five practice rounds were
then conducted with identical rules to the actual experiment. To minimize the inﬂuence
of the practice rounds, subjects were rematched with a diﬀerent opponent for the 80-round
experiment.
In the ﬁrst two treatments, subject pairs progressed through the 80 rounds at their own
pace. After completing the experiment, subjects completed a questionnaire and remained
seated until others had ﬁnished to avoid discovering their partners’ identity. In the random
rematching treatment, the pairs could be formed randomly each round only after the last
subject had made a decision.
An important feature of our experimental design that allows us to compare subjects’
behavior across pairs and across treatments is our use of one pair of randomly drawn se-
quences of 80 numbers (85 numbers including the ﬁve practice rounds) from 1 to 5. Before
beginning the experiments, we drew two 80-round sequences, one for each pair member. We
applied these sequences to all subjects in all sessions and treatments.11 Thus, for instance,
in round 56 regardless of pair, session or treatment, the subject arbitrarily designated player
A received a value of 2, while player B received a value of 4.12
10 No one was excluded from participating. All subjects who showed up answered correctly all of the
questions in the allotted time.
11 In practice, due to an undetected bug in the software, the order of numbers varied slightly between
some sessions, sometimes causing numbers intended for the practice rounds to replace numbers from the
experimental rounds. Notwithstanding, the two sequences of numbers remain nearly identical across pairs
and sessions.
12 The astute reader will note that to preserve the identical sequence of values in the random rematching
144.3 Subjects and Payments
Since the experiment requires a very basic knowledge of probabilities, participation was
limited to economics, engineering, business, natural science, mathematics and computer
science students. Students who had taken a class in experimental economics were not allowed
to participate.
Sixty-two subjects participated in one of the three AfterFixed sessions, 62 subjects in one
of the three NeverFixed sessions, and 46 subjects in one of the two AfterRandom sessions (24
in one session and 22 in the other). A session took between 75 and 85 minutes for the ﬁrst
two treatments, and approximately 100 to 110 minutes for the AfterRandom treatment. To
compensate the students in the random rematching treatment for the extra time required,
a ﬁxed payment of 10 shekels was added to their experimental earnings. In order to hold
constant the marginal incentives across treatments, the experimental-currency-to-shekel ratio
was ﬁxed at 1:0.6 for all three treatments.
5 Results
5.1 Cooperation across Treatments
Table 1 presents the percentage of rounds in which subjects entered for a given number by
treatment. Thus, in the baseline treatment, AfterFixed, subjects entered only 16.3% of the
time they drew the number 1. These summary statistics reveal a number of ﬁndings. First,
as expected, cooperation increases by increasing information or by ﬁxing partners. Second,
not all subjects are playing the Nash equilibrium. Exit is the modal decision for the number
1 in all treatments and also for the number 2 in the AfterFixed treatment. Moreover, the
sharp spike in entry percentages in going from the number 2 to 3 in all three treatments
treatment requires that each subject be designated either a player A or a player B and that the random
rematching of player As be restricted to player Bs.
15suggests that many subjects may be employing the optimal symmetric cutoﬀ strategy of 2.5.
Finally, that not all subjects are entering all of the time on numbers 4 and 5, particularly in
NeverFixed, suggests the use of alternating strategies for which entry and exit decisions are
independent of the numbers received. In the next subsection, we estimate either the cutoﬀ
or alternating strategy that best ﬁts each individual subject’s observed decisions.
[insert Table 1 here]
Comparing entry on diﬀerent numbers across treatments, Table 1 reveals that the fre-
quency of entry is markedly higher in NeverFixed than in AfterFixed for the number 1 (30.8%
vs. 16.3%) and for 2 (53.8% vs. 29.4%). A χ2 test of proportions rejects the equality of the
entry proportions for the distribution of numbers 1 to 5 across the AfterFixed and Nev-
erFixed treatments, χ2 = 94.38, df = 4, p = .001. By the same token, we can reject the
equality of the entry proportions by number for the AfterFixed and AfterRandom treatments,
χ2 = 108.40, df = 4, p = .001. On the other hand, although Table 1 suggests a slightly
higher tendency to enter on numbers 2 and 3 in the AfterRandom treatment, we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the proportions of entries by number in the NeverFixed and
AfterRandom treatments, χ2 = 4.58, df = 4, p = .334.
Further evidence that cooperation in AfterFixed is signiﬁcantly higher than in Never-
Fixed or AfterRandom, but that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the latter two
treatments comes from a comparison of subjects’ proﬁts. We computed average subject
earnings by treatment as a percentage of the full-information, eﬃcient outcome in which
only the player with the higher number enters (in the case of ties, only one player enters),
given the actual distribution of numbers drawn over the 80 rounds. While this outcome is
not feasible in our experiments with private information and no communication, it serves
as a useful benchmark. In AfterFixed, subjects earned on average 71.6% of this ﬁrst-best,
social optimum, signiﬁcantly higher than the 67.6% achieved in NeverFixed and 66.9% in
AfterRandom. All of these yields are markedly higher than the 53.8% oﬀered by Nash play,
16attesting to the relatively high levels of cooperation in all three treatments.13
We estimate a random eﬀects Probit model to explain the variation in subject i’s decision
to enter in period t. The speciﬁcation for our random eﬀects Probit model for each of the
three treatments is as follows,14
  Enterit = constant + β1 ∗ C1.5 + β2 ∗ C2.5 + β3 ∗ C3.5 + β4 ∗ C4.5 + (1)
β5 ∗ Enteri,t−1 + β6 ∗ Enter−i,t−1 + β7 ∗ first10 + β8 ∗ last10 + ǫit,





1 if   Enterit ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
The dummy variable C1.5 equals one if player i’s period t number is 2, 3, 4 or 5 and
equals zero if it is 1; similarly, C2.5 equals one for numbers 3, 4 and 5, and zero otherwise,
and so forth for C3.5 and C4.5. The marginal eﬀects of the estimated coeﬃcients on these
variables can be interpreted as the marginal propensity to enter for numbers 2, 3, 4 and 5,
respectively. Also included in the regression equation are the subject’s own last-period entry
decision, Enteri,t−1, and that of his opponent, Enter−i,t−1. Finally, we control for initial
learning and end-game eﬀects by including dummies for the ﬁrst 10 and last 10 periods,
respectively. The error term, ǫit, is composed of a random error, uit, and a subject-speciﬁc
random eﬀect, αi.
Table 2 displays the regression coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects for each of the three
treatments. All of the variables are signiﬁcant in AfterFixed. In particular, the computed
marginal eﬀects displayed in the second column indicate that a subject is 13.9% more likely
13 Other eﬃciency measures include play according to the optimal symmetric pure-strategy cutoﬀ of 2.5,
which yields 75.9%, the alternating strategy, which yields 78.9% if player A enters in the odd rounds or
82.5% if player B does, and the outcome in which both players exit in every round, which returns 0%.
14 The presence of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor renders our estimates inconsistent. To
correct for this, we estimated a correlated random eﬀects model (Chamberlain, 1980) in which subject i’s
ﬁrst-period entry decision and number were also included as regressors. (In the AfterRandom treatment, the
ﬁrst-period entry decision is dropped since all 46 subjects entered in period 1.) Because all of the results are
qualitatively identical to our random eﬀects Probit results, we report the latter for simplicity.
17to enter on a 2 than a 1, 58.7% more likely to enter on a 3 than a 2, 22.1% more likely
to enter on a 4 than a 3 and 5.5% more likely to enter on a 4 than a 5. These estimates
correspond closely to the diﬀerences in percentages of entries by number reported in Table
1, despite the inclusion of a number of other signiﬁcant controls in the regressions. For
instance, if a subject entered in the previous round, he is less likely to enter this round,
while if his opponent entered last round, he is more likely to enter this round. Both of
these ﬁndings are consistent with the pair employing alternating strategies. Finally, the
signiﬁcance of “ﬁrst10” and “last10” supports initial learning and end-game eﬀects in the
anticipated direction: subjects are less likely to enter early on and more likely to enter toward
the end of the game.
[insert Table 2 here]
The regression results from the NeverFixed and AfterRandom treatments are very similar,
the main diﬀerences being that the C4.5 variable is no longer signiﬁcant in NeverFixed, while
neither C3.5 nor C4.5 is signiﬁcant in AfterRandom. Table 1 reveals an entry frequency
of 97.2% (693/713 times) on the number 3 in AfterRandom, oﬀering little scope for more
frequent entry on the number 4.
Moreover, the initial learning eﬀect captured by the “ﬁrst10” variable is not signiﬁcant
in either of these treatments. Intuitively, subjects do not adapt their behavior in response to
their opponents’ early choices (with the exception of unrequited alternating) because reci-
procity cannot easily be dispensed in these treatments; in NeverFixed, since the opponent’s
number is never revealed, his motive for entering remains ambiguous, while fair play cannot
be rewarded and cheating cannot be punished in AfterRandom because the opponent keeps
changing.
One curiosity in AfterRandom is the continued signiﬁcant, negative coeﬃcient on the
subject’s own previous-period decision, indicative of alternators in spite of the impossibil-
ity of coordinating on alternating strategies when partners are randomly rematched each
18round. Anticipating the strategy inference results in the next subsection, there exists one
subject who alternated, entering in odd rounds and exiting in even ones in 79/80 rounds.
To account for this outlier, we estimate an additional speciﬁcation that includes an inter-
action dummy variable for subject 17 and his previous-period decision. The coeﬃcient of
−6.29 on subject17 ∗ Enteri,t−1 is strongly signiﬁcant (p < .01), whereas the coeﬃcient on
Enteri,t−1 is no longer signiﬁcant (p = .48), suggesting the absence of correlation between
one’s previous-period and current-period decisions, after controlling for the number received
in each period.
The estimates of ρ in Table 2 measure the fraction of the error term’s variance accounted
for by subject-speciﬁc variance. The highly signiﬁcant estimates ranging from 0.395 in
AfterFixed to 0.569 in AfterRandom indicate that between 40% and 57% of the variance in
the error term is explained by subject heterogeneity.
5.2 Individual Strategies
To understand better the heterogeneity in subject behavior, we infer the strategy that best
ﬁts each subject’s observed decisions. For each subject, we compare the ability of the diﬀerent
cutoﬀ and alternating strategies to classify correctly the subject’s entry and exit choices. For
diﬀerent time horizons over the 80-round game, we compute the goodness of ﬁt for each of
the possible pure-strategy cutoﬀs, c ∈ {0.5,1.5,2.5,3.5,4.5,5.5}, and the two alternating
strategies, enter in even rounds, exit otherwise and enter in odd rounds, exit otherwise. The
strategy that minimizes the number of errors in classifying the subject’s observed decisions
is selected as the one that the subject most likely employed.15
15 This methodology is a much simpliﬁed version of the strategy inference technique developed in Engle-
Warnick and Ruﬄe (2004) because it permits only one decision rule of the form “if [condition satisﬁed], then
Enter; otherwise Exit”. We do not allow for nested rules. Accordingly, the technique does not allow for
changes in subjects’ strategies over time. Furthermore, our simple technique implicitly assumes a common
prior over all strategies under consideration. Its simplicity notwithstanding, this technique does remarkably
well in organizing subjects’ decisions, as reﬂected in the very low error rates in Table 3.
19[insert Table 3 here]
Table 3 reports the distribution of individuals’ best-ﬁt strategies for rounds 11–70 by
treatment. In the case where two strategies explain a subject’s decisions equally well, each
of the tied strategies receives half a point. Thus, for instance, nine subjects are playing
according to the Nash equilibrium strategy of c = 0.5; for one of these subjects, the cutoﬀ
strategy c = 1.5 ﬁts his decisions equally well. Excluding the ﬁrst 10 and the last 10 rounds
reduces the error rates by minimizing the inﬂuences of the observed learning and end-game
eﬀects. All but one to three (depending on the treatment) of the individual best-ﬁt strategies
are robust to the diﬀerent time horizons tested, like all 80 rounds, the last 60 rounds, the
last 40 rounds and rounds 16–65.
Overall, this simple inference technique ﬁts the data well as seen in the error rates of 6%,
8% and 5% for each of the three treatments respectively. Thus, of the 3720 decisions made
by the 62 subjects in AfterFixed between rounds 11 and 70, 3479 of them correspond to the
best-ﬁt strategy inferred for each subject. By comparison, if we assume that all subjects
are playing the Nash equilibrium strategy, then the third-to-last row of data in Table 3
indicates that the error rates jump to between 21% and 32% depending on the treatment. In
addition, we generated random decisions for subjects calibrating the probability of entry to
match the observed overall rate of entry in each treatment (.677, .744 and .793 for the three
treatments, respectively). We then calculated the error rate from these random decisions for
each subject’s best-ﬁtting strategy and for each subject assuming Nash play. The results in
the bottom two rows of Table 3 again demonstrate that our inferred strategies on the actual
data ﬁt the data much better than the best-ﬁtting and Nash strategies on the randomly
generated data. This suggests that subjects are indeed playing in a non-random, methodic
fashion that can be captured by cutoﬀ and alternating strategies.16
16 A complementary method to determine the strategies subjects play is to ask them. We did this in a
post-experiment questionnaire. For cases in which their responses are interpretable, they match our inferred
strategies exceptionally well, with the caveat that many subjects claim to decide randomly when in fact their
20Despite the slight payoﬀ advantage and lower payoﬀ variance of the alternating strategy,
we ﬁnd that the optimal symmetric cutoﬀ strategy of c∗ = 2.5 best characterizes the decisions
of 39/62 subjects in the AfterFixed treatment. In fact, several pairs coordinate on this
strategy without even a single error, while in other pairs, one partner occasionally deviates
by entering on the number 2. Pair 17 is a case in point. Player 17B decides according to the
cutoﬀ c∗ = 2.5 ﬂawlessly through all 80 rounds; his opponent’s best-ﬁt strategy is also the
cutoﬀ c∗ = 2.5; however, in rounds 35 and 52, he “cheats” by entering on a 2. Nine subjects
appear to be employing the cutoﬀ of 1.5, nine other subjects’ strategy is to enter all of the
time (c = 0.5), four subjects (two of whom form a pair) use the hyper-cooperative cutoﬀ of
3.5, and only one pair of subjects uses alternating strategies. Pair 21 begins alternating in
period 33 and continues without deviation through period 80.
Table 4 displays the numbers and decisions for a pair of subjects from each of the three
treatments. The number of errors for each pure-strategy cutoﬀ value and the alternating
strategies for rounds 11–70 are displayed below the decisions of each subject, with the num-
ber of errors for the best-ﬁt strategy highlighted in bold.17 Pair 10 (shown in Table 4)
demonstrates the necessity that both pair members employ the complementary alternating
strategies for them to endure. Player 10A begins alternating in period 1, exiting in odd
rounds and entering in even ones. Her opponent shows signs of alternating, except when he
receives a 4 or 5 in which case he enters. Player 10A continues to alternate through period
16 despite four entries and one exit out of turn by 10B. In round 17, 10A receives a 5 and
enters, breaking her alternating pattern. The pair eventually appears to coordinate on the
cutoﬀ strategy c∗ = 2.5, until round 64 in which 10B enters on a 2. From round 71 through
the ﬁnal round, both players enter in every round.
[insert Table 4 here]
decisions display a clear tendency to enter on higher numbers and exit on lower ones.
17 We display subject pairs with above average error rates for the simple reason that the behavior of
subjects who stick to a strategy with few or no errors is easily and more parsimoniously described in words.
21The NeverFixed treatment is a more likely candidate for alternating because the playing of
cutoﬀ strategies cannot be observed and, as a result, cannot be enforced. Still, a meager two
out of 31 pairs coordinate on the alternating strategies. Pairs 5 and 7 adopt the alternating
strategies in rounds 2 and 8, respectively, and play them without error for the duration. An
additional subject whose best-ﬁt strategy is enter in odd rounds eventually abandons this
strategy after his opponent failed to adopt the complementary alternating strategy.
The distribution of best-ﬁt strategies shown in Table 4 reveals a marked shift from higher
to lower entry cutoﬀ values in going from AfterFixed to NeverFixed or from AfterFixed to
AfterRandom. For example, the percentage of subjects playing the optimal symmetric pure-
strategy cutoﬀ of 2.5 declines from 62.1% in AfterFixed to 38.7% in NeverFixed or to 38.0%
in AfterRandom, while those who play the Nash equilibrium increases from 13.7% to 20.2%
(NeverFixed) or 22.8% (AfterRandom). Like the overall proportions of entry by number and
by treatment in Table 1 and subjects’ actual earnings as a percentage of the social optimum,
both discussed in section 5.1, the individual inferred strategies again point to a decline in
cooperation when less information is provided or partners are randomly reformed, but no
diﬀerence in the cooperative behavior between these two conditions.
The percentage of entry decisions by number displayed in Table 1 and the Probit regres-
sion results from Table 2 also reveal subjects’ willingness to cooperate in these experiments.
What our strategy analysis adds is the observation that pair members typically coordinate
on the same cooperative strategy. In the AfterFixed treatment, of the 30 pairs that employ
cutoﬀ strategies, 22 of them coordinate on the same cutoﬀ values, while 16/28 pairs do so
in NeverFixed, despite not being able to observe the other’s numbers. Moreover, for all 12
pairs in which partners do not coordinate on the same cutoﬀs, their inferred cutoﬀs diﬀer by
only one integer value and their error rates tend to be above average due to an ambivalence
between two competing cutoﬀ values. Pair 30, displayed in Table 4, represents a case in
point. Player 30A begins by alternating, entering if and only if the round number is odd.
22Player 30B, however, has his own agenda, consistently exiting on 1s and 2s and entering
on 3s, 4s and 5s, with only 3 exceptions over the entire 80 rounds (namely, entering on a
2 in rounds 30 and 41 and on a 1 in round 80). Because his opponent does not adopt the
complementary alternating strategy, 30A enters deﬁantly on a 1 in rounds 18 and 20, before
adopting the cutoﬀ of 1.5 and playing it with few deviations until the end.18
6 Discussion
6.1 Is the shame of being seen cheating enough?
The ﬁnding that play in AfterRandom is no less cooperative than in NeverFixed is, in our
view, surprising. In NeverFixed, if a player does not play cooperatively and enters every
period or “too often”, his opponent may retaliate by entering in every period. Such recourse
is not available when opponents are randomly rematched in every round. The mere fact
that cheating or non-cooperative play is fully observable (even if it isn’t punishable) in
AfterRandom appears to be suﬃcient to keep players in line. The question remains whether
this result extends to a much larger sample population where the probability is inﬁnitesimally
small that player X will ever meet someone who has played against him, or whether he will
ever meet someone who has played someone who has played against player X, ad inﬁnitum.19
6.2 What makes a cooperative strategy ubiquitous?
Although the pair’s expected proﬁt from employing the alternating strategy is slightly higher
(by 9/75 of a unit per period) and the variance lower than those from the optimal symmetric
18 Player 30A is among the few subjects for whom a nested strategy would substantially improve the
errors in classifying his decisions. Allowing a nested strategy of the form, “if round < 18, then Enter on Odd
rounds; otherwise (if number > 1, then Enter, otherwise Exit)”, decreases the subject’s errors from 9 to 4
for rounds 11–70 and from 15 to 6 for all 80 rounds.
19 An experimenter can avoid even this indirect contact by forming pairs using the turnpike method, which
requires at least twice as many subjects per session as rounds.
23cutoﬀ strategy of c∗ = 2.5, the overwhelming majority of subjects employ the latter strategy.
We believe that there are three important reasons for this.
First, the alternating strategy must be implemented by both pair members to be eﬀec-
tive; unilateral use of this strategy is very costly, and, as we saw with the individuals who
attempted to implement it alone, eventually abandoned. By contrast, cooperation according
to a cutoﬀ strategy involves staying out on the lowest numbers, when it is least costly to do
so.
Second, the alternating strategy ignores the values to entry in each round. Instead it
relies on an algorithm seemingly void of economic appeal to determine whether to enter.
The lack of economic appeal becomes especially salient when a player receives the number 5
and it is his turn to exit.
Third, suppose a player fears his opponent might tremble in implementing his intended
strategy. In the case of the alternating strategy, an error means that a player enters when
it is not his turn (when his opponent enters) and exits when he is supposed to enter. In
the former, the mistake reduces his entering opponent’s payoﬀ by 2/3 and, in the latter, the
opponent’s payoﬀ of zero from exiting is unchanged. In the case of the symmetric cutoﬀ
strategies of c∗ = 2.5, a tremble by a player means that either he enters with numbers 1 and
2 or exits with numbers 3, 4, and 5. If each of these errors is equally likely, then an error
means that the player is entering less frequently (with probability 2/5 compared to 3/5 with
no errors). As a result, a player’s error actually beneﬁts his opponent.
With these disadvantages associated with the alternating strategy, the slight 0.12 unit per
round advantage for the pair was inadequate. One could magnify the alternating strategy’s
joint-expected-payoﬀ advantage, thus making its adoption more likely, by shrinking either
the absolute or percentage diﬀerence between a and b. For instance, we would expect to
see more alternating when players’ integers are drawn from a uniform distribution between
6 and 10 where the joint expected per round payoﬀ from alternating is 8 compared to 6.35
24from c∗ = 6.5. By shrinking the absolute diﬀerence between a and b to the extreme case
where a = b, we would expect all players to adopt alternating. In short, alternating makes
increasing sense as players’ values to entering become more alike. If children’s utilities from
riding in the front seat are similar, they will take turns enjoying this privilege. By the same
token, ﬁrms with similar expected proﬁts from introducing a new product into the market
seem able to coordinate on rotating the timing with which they do so, as demonstrated by
the examples of motion-picture and baseball-card releases (Zillante 2003).
6.3 Implications of our Results and Extensions
Slight changes in our experimental parameters can produce a very diﬀerent game. For in-
stance, a negative lower bound on the range of numbers, a, allows for spite. A subject who
receives a negative number and enters has points subtracted from his proﬁt. His choice to
enter despite a negative payoﬀ stems from a desire to punish his partner. Spiteful behavior
has been observed and resulted in more eﬃcient contributions to public goods (Cason, Saijo
and Yamato 2002; Fehr and Gachter 2000) and higher oﬀers in proposer-responder games
(Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund 2003). Moreover, we explored in this paper two real-
izations of the timing-at-which-a-subject-learns-his-opponent’s-number variable (After and
Never). We could also permit subjects to observe their opponents’ numbers Before deciding
whether to enter or exit. Under this full-information condition, the socially optimal strategy
changes to enter for the subject with the higher number and exit for the other subject.20
The pair’s expected per-period payoﬀ increases to 3.80,21 compared to 3 for alternating and
2.88 for c∗ = 2.5.
There are additional ways to achieve this socially optimal outcome, even in the absence
20 Note that with full information and k < 2, the socially optimal strategies depend on players’ numbers.
For example, with numbers are 3 and 5, both should enter; however, if their numbers are 2 and 5 and
7/5 < k < 2, then only the high-value player should enter.
21 This assumes that the pair coordinates on only one person entering whenever they have the same
number; if they both enter whenever they have the same number, then their expected payoﬀ is 3.40.
25of full information. For instance, if we allow subjects to transmit a number or series of
numbers to their opponents (cheap talk), then the decision to reveal truthfully and precisely
one’s number can permit optimal cooperation. Alternatively, if subjects are allowed to oﬀer
side payments (bribes) to their opponents prior to entry decisions, then the size of the side
payment may signal perfectly the player’s number and optimal cooperation may be achieved.
In the absence of communication, our results demonstrate notably high levels of coopera-
tion, especially when compared to repeated prisoners’ dilemma and public-goods experiments
in which convergence toward the unique dominant strategy of defection has been documented
in dozens of experiments. Accordingly, our results speak to the ability of duopolists to collude
implicitly, suggesting that even if antitrust authorities commit more resources to monitoring
and punishing communication between ﬁrms and through such eﬀorts succeed at preventing
it, implicit collusion will prevail. This begs the question of whether more than two ﬁrms are
able to collude in our environment.
7 Conclusions
There are a large number of opportunities for cooperative behavior in the real world that
have heretofore not been studied theoretically or tested experimentally. These situations
are characterized by a tension between the unique noncooperative equilibrium in which both
players defect and the socially optimal outcome in which one player cooperates and the other
defects.
In this paper, we introduce such a game. Our game is unique in that the socially optimal
outcome involves one player defecting and the other cooperating or backing down. Because
cooperation yields a payoﬀ of zero, it cannot reasonably be expected in a one-shot game,
except under very special circumstances (e.g. when the value to defection is suﬃciently low).
In a repeated game, the challenge lies in coordinating who will back down and under what
26circumstances. Accordingly, we conduct our game repeatedly under diﬀerent conditions with
the goal of determining whether and what kind of cooperation will emerge when players’
values for defection are private. Cooperation generally takes the form of cutoﬀ strategies
whereby players cooperate when their values for defection are suﬃciently low. We observe
very high levels of cooperation even when defection cannot be observed or punished. What
is more, pair members coordinate exceedingly well on the same cooperative strategies. For
whatever reason, few pairs elect to coordinate on the cooperative strategies whereby they
take turns cooperating and defecting.
In this paper, we have tested cooperative behavior in only a small number of games (all
with private information) from those possible given the generality of the game structure.
Future research will explore other variations and their cooperative and eﬃciency properties
under diﬀerent informational conditions.
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Appendix
Pre-Experiment Questions
1. How many numbers are there in the range of 1 to 5?
2. What is the probability of obtaining the number “4” in any given round?
3. What is the anticipated average of the numbers you will receive over the entire 80 rounds of
play?
4. Suppose that you have received the number “1” during three consecutive rounds. What is the
probability of receiving another“1” in the next round?
5. Suppose that you receive the number “1” and your opponent receives the number “2” in a
particular round.
a. If you both enter, what will be your payoﬀ from this round? What will be your opponent’s
payoﬀ?
a. If you enter and your opponent exits, what will be your payoﬀ from this round? What will be
your opponent’s payoﬀ?
b. If you both exit, what will be your payoﬀ from this round? What will be your opponent’s payoﬀ?
c. If you exit and your opponent enters, what will be your payoﬀ from this round? What will be
your opponent’s payoﬀ?
Instructions to Participant
The experiment in which you will participate involves the study of decision-making. The in-
structions are simple. If you follow them carefully and make wise decisions, you may earn a
considerable amount of money. Your earnings depend on your decisions. All of your decisions will
29Other Person
Enter Exit
Enter x/3, y/3 x, 0
You Exit 0, y 0, 0
remain anonymous and will be collected through a computer network. Your choices are to be made
at the computer at which you are seated. Your earnings will be revealed to you as they accumulate
during the course of the experiment. Your total earnings from the experiment will be paid to you,
in cash, at the end of the experiment.
There are several experiments of the same type, which are taking place at the same time in this
room.
This experiment consists of 80 rounds. You will be paired with another person. This person
will remain the same for all 80 rounds. Each round consists of the following sequence of events.
At the beginning of the round, you and the person with whom you are paired each receives a
randomly and independently drawn integer number from 1 to 5 inclusive. This number is your
private information, that is, the other person will not see your number and you will not see the
other person’s number. After seeing your numbers, each of you must decide separately between one
of two actions: enter or exit. At the end of each round, your number, your action, and the other
person’s action determine your round proﬁt in the following way. If you both chose to exit, then
you both receive zero points. If you chose to exit and the other person chose to enter, then you
receive zero points and the other person receives points equal to his number. On the other hand,
if you chose to enter and the other person chose to exit, you receive points equal to your number
and the other person receives zero points. If you both chose to enter, then you receive points equal
to half of your number and the other person receives points equal to half of his number. The table
below summarizes the payoﬀ structure.
Suppose you receive a number, x, and the other person receives a number, y. The round proﬁts
for each of the given pair of decisions are indicated in the table below. The number preceding the
comma refers to your round proﬁt; the number after the comma is the other person’s round proﬁt.
After you have both made your decisions for the round, you will see the amount of points you
have earned for the round, the other person’s decision and his number. When you are ready to
begin the next round, press Next.
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your accumulated earnings from the experiment
in cash. While the earnings are being counted, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire. Prior
to the beginning of the experiment, you will partake in a number of practice rounds. The rules of
the practice rounds are identical to those of the experiment in which you will participate. Note
well that for the purpose of the practice rounds, you will be paired with a diﬀerent person from
the actual experiment. The purpose of the practice rounds is to familiarize you with the rules of
the experiment and the computer interface. The proﬁts earned in these practice rounds will not
be included in your payment. If you have any questions, raise your hand and a monitor will assist
you. It is important that you understand the instructions. Misunderstandings can result in losses
in proﬁt.
30Joint expected payoff as a function of players' symmetric cutoff strategies and k
The pair's joint expected payoff as a function of symmetric pure-strategy cutoffs 0.5 to
5.5 for the range of numbers 1 to 5 and the indicated values of k.
Number AfterFixed NeverFixed AfterRandom
1 16.3% 30.8% 31.0%
2 29.4% 53.8% 64.0%
3 86.2% 88.8% 97.2%
4 98.0% 95.6% 98.1%
5 98.5% 95.4% 98.9%
Overall 67.7% 74.4% 79.3%
For each number, each cell indicates the percentage of
entry across all subjects in the treatment.
Figure 1
Table 1



































k=5Variable coefficient marginal  coefficient marginal  coefficient marginal  coefficient marginal 
(std. error) effect (std. error) effect (std. error) effect (std. error) effect
0.513*** 0.790*** 1.386***     1.473***
(0.079) (0.070) (0.096) (0.102)
2.161*** 1.522*** 2.088*** 2.344***
(0.081) (0.083) (0.138) (0.157)
1.039*** 0.653*** 0.231 0.334
(0.112) (0.105) (0.175) (0.213)
0.257* 0.025 0.290 0.382
(0.156) (0.118) (0.208) (0.271)
-0.257*** -0.734*** -0.350*** -0.071
(0.065) (0.066) (0.094) (0.100)
-6.290***
(0.515)
0.356*** 0.563*** 0.162* 0.197**
(0.065) (0.064) (0.092) (0.098)
-0.246*** -0.123 -0.036 -0.035
(0.089) (0.082) (0.110) (0.116)
0.563*** 0.542*** 0.519*** 0.654***
(0.091) (0.086) (0.128) (0.140)
-1.247 -0.655 -0.594 -0.585
(0.104) (0.106) (0.150) (0.183)
Number of Obs. 4898 4898 3634 3634
0.395 0.406 0.512 0.569
(0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.039)
Log L -1244.3 -1486.3 -773.0 -685.2
*** p-value less than .01
**  p-value less than .05
*   p-value less than .10
Random effects Probit regression results for each of the three treatments. The entry decision of subject i in period t is regressed
on dummy variables for the numbers received, the subject's and his opponent's last-period entry decision and whether the game
is in the first 10 or last 10 rounds of play.
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The dependent variable is subject i's entry decision in period t.






c*=0.5 (always Enter) 8.5 (.137) 12.5 (.202) 10.5 (.228)
c*=1.5 9 (.145) 19.5 (.314) 17 (.370)
c*=2.5 38.5 (.621) 24 (.387) 17.5 (.380)
c*=3.5 4 (.064) 1 (.016) 0
c*=4.5 0 0 0
c*=5.5 (always Exit) 0 0 0
Enter in odd rounds 1 (.016) 3 (.048) 1 (.022)
Enter in even rounds 1 (.016) 2 (.032) 0
Total 62 (1) 62 (1) 46 (1)
experimental data
best-fitting strategies 0.06 0.08 0.05
probability Nash equilibrium strategy 0.32 0.26 0.21
of error  randomly generated data
best-fitting strategies 0.32 0.25 0.22
Nash equilibrium strategy 0.33 0.25 0.22
Number (fraction) of subjects whose best-fit strategy based on their decisions from rounds
11-70 corresponds to the one indicated. The average error rates from classifying subjects
according to these inferred strategies and from the assumption that all subjects are playing 
the Nash equilibrium are shown along with the average error rates for randomly generated data.
Table 3
Strategy Inference Results by Treatment
{
{
Strategy TreatmentRound A B 10A 10B A B 30A 30B A B 8A OppB
1 4 5 Exit Enter 3 5 Enter Enter 3 5 Enter Enter
2 3 4 Enter Enter 1 2 Exit Exit 1 2 Enter Exit
3 3 5 Exit Enter 2 1 Enter Exit 2 1 Exit Enter
4 4 2 Enter Exit 5 4 Exit Enter 5 4 Enter Enter
5 2 4 Exit Enter 5 1 Enter Exit 5 1 Enter Exit
6 1 3 Enter Exit 4 3 Exit Enter 4 3 Enter Enter
7 3 3 Exit Enter 1 5 Enter Enter 1 5 Exit Enter
8 1 2 Enter Exit 2 5 Exit Enter 2 5 Exit Enter
9 1 3 Exit Enter 3 2 Enter Exit 3 2 Enter Enter
10 4 4 Enter Enter 1 3 Exit Enter 1 3 Exit Enter
11 1 5 Exit Enter 2 3 Enter Enter 2 3 Enter Enter
12 2 2 Enter Exit 3 2 Exit Exit 3 2 Enter Enter
13 2 1 Exit Exit 5 4 Enter Enter 5 4 Enter Enter
14 4 2 Enter Enter 4 2 Exit Exit 4 2 Enter Enter
15 2 2 Exit Exit 2 2 Enter Exit 2 2 Exit Enter
16 1 5 Enter Enter 4 3 Exit Enter 4 3 Enter Enter
17 5 2 Enter Enter 1 4 Enter Enter 1 4 Exit Enter
18 2 4 Exit Enter 1 1 Enter Exit 1 1 Exit Exit
19 1 3 Exit Enter 5 3 Enter Enter 5 3 Enter Enter
20 3 4 Enter Enter 1 1 Enter Exit 2 5 Exit Enter
21 4 4 Enter Enter 5 4 Enter Enter 5 5 Enter Enter
22 4 4 Enter Enter 5 1 Enter Exit 5 3 Enter Enter
23 3 3 Enter Enter 4 5 Enter Enter 5 3 Enter Enter
24 3 2 Enter Exit 5 2 Enter Exit 4 3 Enter Enter
25 2 4 Enter Enter 1 4 Exit Enter 1 1 Exit Exit
26 1 4 Exit Enter 5 3 Enter Enter 2 4 Enter Enter
27 4 3 Enter Enter 4 5 Enter Enter 4 4 Enter Enter
28 3 5 Enter Enter 3 4 Enter Enter 3 5 Enter Enter
29 1 2 Exit Enter 3 5 Enter Enter 4 4 Enter Enter
30 2 1 Enter Exit 4 2 Enter Enter 1 4 Exit Enter
31 5 4 Enter Enter 2 4 Enter Enter 3 2 Enter Exit
32 5 1 Enter Exit 1 3 Exit Enter 3 1 Enter Exit
33 4 3 Enter Enter 3 3 Enter Enter 1 5 Exit Enter
34 1 5 Exit Enter 1 2 Exit Exit 5 5 Enter Enter
35 2 5 Exit Enter 1 3 Exit Enter 5 2 Enter Exit
36 3 2 Enter Exit 4 4 Enter Enter 3 1 Enter Exit
37 1 3 Exit Enter 1 5 Enter Enter 3 2 Enter Enter
38 2 3 Exit Enter 2 2 Enter Exit 5 4 Enter Enter
39 3 2 Enter Exit 2 1 Enter Exit 4 2 Enter Enter
40 5 4 Enter Enter 4 2 Enter Exit 4 4 Enter Enter
41 4 2 Enter Exit 2 2 Exit Enter 3 4 Enter Enter
42 2 2 Exit Exit 1 5 Exit Enter 3 3 Enter Enter
43 4 3 Enter Enter 5 2 Enter Exit 5 5 Enter Enter
44 1 4 Exit Enter 2 4 Enter Enter 1 2 Exit Exit
45 1 1 Exit Exit 1 3 Exit Enter 3 2 Enter Enter






Decisions and Errors by Strategy for a Pair of Subjects in each Treatment
Numbers Players47 2 5 Exit Enter 2 5 Enter Enter 5 4 Enter Enter
48 5 5 Enter Enter 5 5 Enter Enter 5 1 Enter Enter
49 5 4 Enter Enter 5 3 Enter Enter 4 5 Enter Enter
50 2 5 Enter Enter 5 3 Enter Enter 5 2 Enter Enter
51 1 5 Exit Enter 4 3 Enter Enter 1 4 Enter Enter
52 2 3 Enter Enter 1 1 Exit Exit 5 3 Enter Enter
53 1 3 Exit Enter 2 4 Enter Enter 4 5 Enter Enter
54 4 1 Enter Exit 4 4 Enter Enter 3 4 Enter Enter
55 5 3 Enter Enter 3 5 Enter Enter 3 5 Enter Enter
56 5 3 Enter Enter 4 4 Enter Enter 4 2 Enter Exit
57 4 3 Enter Enter 1 4 Enter Enter 2 4 Enter Enter
58 1 1 Exit Exit 3 2 Enter Exit 1 3 Exit Enter
59 2 4 Enter Enter 3 1 Enter Exit 3 3 Enter Enter
60 4 4 Enter Enter 1 5 Exit Enter 1 2 Enter Exit
61 3 5 Exit Enter 5 5 Enter Enter 1 3 Exit Enter
62 4 4 Enter Enter 5 2 Enter Exit 4 4 Enter Enter
63 1 4 Exit Enter 3 1 Enter Exit 1 5 Enter Enter
64 3 2 Enter Enter 3 2 Enter Exit 2 2 Enter Enter
65 3 1 Exit Exit 5 4 Enter Enter 2 1 Exit Exit
66 1 5 Exit Enter 4 2 Enter Exit 4 2 Enter Exit
67 5 5 Enter Enter 4 4 Enter Enter 2 2 Enter Enter
68 5 2 Enter Enter 3 4 Enter Enter 1 5 Exit Enter
69 3 1 Exit Exit 3 3 Enter Enter 5 2 Enter Enter
70 3 2 Enter Exit 5 5 Enter Enter 2 4 Enter Enter
71 5 4 Enter Enter 1 2 Exit Exit 1 3 Exit Enter
72 4 2 Enter Enter 3 2 Enter Exit 3 4 Enter Enter
73 4 4 Enter Enter 4 4 Enter Enter 4 4 Enter Enter
74 3 4 Enter Enter 4 4 Enter Enter 4 4 Enter Enter
75 3 3 Enter Enter 5 4 Enter Enter 5 4 Enter Enter
76 5 5 Enter Enter 2 5 Exit Enter 2 5 Enter Enter
77 1 2 Enter Enter 1 5 Exit Enter 1 5 Enter Enter
78 3 2 Enter Enter 2 3 Enter Enter 2 3 Enter Enter
79 1 1 Enter Enter 1 3 Enter Enter 1 3 Enter Enter
80 5 4 Enter Enter 4 1 Enter Enter 4 1 Enter Enter
(rounds 11-70)
c=0.5 23 16 12 19 13
c=1.5 11 8 9 12 6
c=2.5 10 5 16 2 9
c=3.5 15 18 26 14 21
c=4.5 26 32 34 30 33
c=5.5 37 44 48 41 47
Enter Odd rounds 37 28 26 21 29
Enter Even rounds 23 32 34 39 31
minimum errors 10 5 9 2 6
The entry and exit decisions for one pair of subjects in each of the treatments. For each of the cutoff
and alternating strategies, the number of incorrectly classified decisions are displayed at the bottom,
with the number of errors for the best-fit strategy in boldface. The column "OppB" represents the
decisions of subject 8A's randomly changing opponents in the AfterRandom treatment. 
errors by strategy